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Abstract—In this paper, we present a new way of generating
behavioral (not biometric) fingerprints from the cellphone
usage data. In particular, we explore if the generated behavioral
fingerprints are memorable enough to be remembered by end
users. We built a system, called HuMan, that generates finger-
prints from cellphone data. To test HuMan, we conducted an
extensive user study that involved collecting about one month
of continuous usage data (including calls, SMSes, application
usage patterns etc.) from 44 Symbian and Android smartphone
users. We evaluated the memorable fingerprints generated
from this rich multi-context data by asking each user to
answer various authentication questions generated from the
fingerprints. Results show that the fingerprints generated by
HuMan are remembered by the user to some extent and were
moderately secure against attacks even by family members and
close friends.
I. INTRODUCTION
Profiling or fingerprinting human behavior has been
widely used as a technique in providing context aware-
ness [1], intrusion detection [2], etc. However, there are
many scenarios in which memorable fingerprints are desir-
able in profiling human behavior. One obvious application
is in authenticating users who are not technically proficient.
Memorable fingerprints are highly useful in these situations
as they can be used to generate authentication questions
that anyone can answer without memorizing or needing
any physical device. Note that memorable is usually more
than memorizable, i.e., a memorable fingerprint is one that
can be recalled and recognized by human users, but is not
necessarily one that needs to be memorized.
Memorable behavioral fingerprints are especially useful
for context-aware applications as it is usually difficult to
understand which aspect of a context a particular user deems
most important, especially when the context is derived from
multiple data sources or the various aspects are conflicting
from one another. For example, a user might have two sets of
nighttime behaviors. One is to call a friend at 10 pm while
the other is to play a mobile game while calling. Which
of these behavioral fingerprints is more important to the
user? A memorable fingerprint would be more significant to
the user and should be given higher weight. Users typically
do not remember details of regular past events especially
when they are not asked to memorize them. In this paper,
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we present HuMan: History-based User Centric Memorable
ApplicatioN as an attempt for generating memorable finger-
prints of cellphone users.
HuMan runs on the user’s cellphone that monitors and
records raw events, e.g., SMSes, calls, location, etc. There-
after it processes the collected records and generates the
memorable fingerprint e.g. “When a call is made, the callee
is David”. A good way to verify the memorability of
these fingerprints with the user is through a question and
answer format, e.g. “Whom do you usually call?”. Thus,
we developed a simple mobile authentication application to
test the viability and usefulness of our fingerprints. The key
features and contributions of the paper are:
• Memorable fingerprints: HuMan is the first attempt
to generate memorable fingerprints from the users’
cellphone usage behavior.
• Multi-context data from cellphone usage: HuMan
generates fingerprints that are derived from data sources
including call, SMS, email, calendar, application usage
and browsing. We do this because fingerprints of dif-
ferent users are usually different.
• Security protection: We subject HuMan to a difficult
security threat model where intimates (family members,
close friends particularly those living with the par-
ticipant) and acquaintance (casual friends, colleagues
particularly those not spending a lot of time interacting
with the participant) try to guess the fingerprints, and
show that it provides moderate resistance to these
threats. This is difficult as we expect family members
and friends to be involved in a significant number of
common activities such as calls and SMSes and are
probably aware of a lot of user activities.
These features and contributions were validated via a user
study involving 44 participants on two different phone oper-
ating systems (Symbian and Android). By analyzing results
from the user studies, we shed light on the characteristics of
memorable fingerprints and how they can be generated. To
minimize the privacy risk as much as we can, HuMan masks
out as much critical information as possible. For example,
the content of SMS and email messages are not logged.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been previous work that tries to understand
the behavior of cellphone users [3], [4], [5]. Unlike those
studies, HuMan is the first system which uses cellphone
usage data from multiple data sources to generate memorable
profiles for the users. We now describe the differences from
past studies in more detail.
Hong et al. studied the behavior of mobile data service
users [4]. In our user study, we are also concerned with
user behavior; however rather than investigating factors that
affect their behavior, we would like to find memorable
signatures that characterize their behavior. In another study,
Hong et al. investigated models that determined mobile
Internet usage [5]. Our fingerprints could also be viewed
as a collective model of user behavior. In addition, we are
concerned with the behavior of individual cellphone users
and the construction of memorable fingerprints.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF HUMAN
HuMan comprises of two modules; a data collection mod-
ule and a fingerprint generation module (see Figure 1). The
data collection module runs in the background on cellphones
and unobtrusively logs all interesting user events. To produce
fingerprints with rich entropy, HuMan collects a wide range
of information on calls, applications, browsing, etc. This
forms the base of HuMan with hundreds of thousands of data
entries. The fingerprint generation module resides above the
data collection module and consists of three sub-modules.
Figure 1. Architecture of HuMan
Data Collection
The data collection module (logger) runs unobtrusively
in the background of the cellphone and captures a wide
range of high level application events that result from user-
phone interactions directly and indirectly. The events logged
include Emails, Location, Calendar events, SMSes, calls etc.
on Symbian (v3.0, 3.1 and 3.2) and Android (v2.1 and
above) OSes. The development of the logger encountered
some challenges. For example, we were limited by the
available APIs on Symbian and the logger for Android
makes use of the root access.
Fingerprint Generation
The data logged by our data collection module is in the
form of raw events, e.g., call made to Bill at 8:12:32 pm
and ended at 8:15:30 pm, which is harder to be remem-
bered by human beings. Following are the steps to generate
memorable fingerprints from raw events.
1) Machine-recognizable rules: We used standard as-
sociation rule mining [6] and sequential rule mining [7]
techniques to form machine-recognizable rules. For exam-
ple the rules from association mining are of the form of
“Whenever Raju calls Ankit, the duration is less than 1
minute”. Similarly from sequential mining the rules are of
like “Whenever Raju calls Ankit on Sunday, he calls David
right after it”.
2) Human-memorable rules: Not all rule components are
easily memorable by human beings. Thus, to transform
machine rules into a human memorable format, we first
developed heuristics to rank the memorability of various
types of information using a survey. We noticed that people
could remember communication- (e.g., SMSes, calls) and
application-based events (i.e. Apps) better. We also found
that many people tend to remember negative rules (e.g.
“you have never called X”) and rules about recent activities
(“application-X was the last one installed”) well. We used
these heuristics to create our base set of templates, which are
in the form of rules with placeholders indicating information
that can be easily memorable, e.g., “make a call to X”.
Fitting the machine-recognizable rules with the templates (an
automatic process) is as easy as matching the placeholders
in the templates with corresponding information in the rules.
3) User-specific fingerprints: The templates generated
may not be user-specific (a template that says “You went
to school at 9 a.m.” could apply equally to multiple users).
We thus manually filter the templates to pick the most
user-specific templates (a fully automated version is future
work). Finally, the small set of the most memorable template
rules that do not overlap are combined to form the final
fingerprint. We are still learning the best way to pick good
template rules when forming the final fingerprint.
IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
We would like to evaluate the effectiveness of our fin-
gerprinting approach to differentiate users from attackers.
Also, we would like to find out what kind of fingerprints
are memorable i.e. the one’s related to a person/time/place
etc. To evaluate HuMan, we installed our logger on the
cellphones of participants for a period of 6 and 4 weeks
for the Symbian and Android studies, respectively, to collect
the raw data. Immediately after the data collection period,
the participants were asked to bring along two persons, an
intimate and an acquaintance for a lab study.
Figure 2. User Interface
To evaluate the memorability of
fingerprints, we used the gener-
ated fingerprint as an authentica-
tion mechanism (see Figure 2). In
particular, we translated the fin-
gerprints into questions with rea-
sonable candidate answers (e.g., a
question involving names would
pick the other name choices from
the participant’s cellphone’s con-
tact list). The ability of participants to answer these questions
correctly gave us insights into the memorability of the
fingerprints. Intimate’s and acquaintance’s answers gave us
insights whether fingerprints are actually resistant to attacks
by people who know users the best. The intimate and
the acquaintance separately and independently answered the
same set of questions.
V. SYMBIAN STUDY
We first discuss the study setup and results of this study,
then present the lessons we learned as well as improvements
made to HuMan as a result.
User Study Setup
As we decided to see if our scheme could replace stan-
dard authentication mechanisms, we decided to design the
question-answering mechanism to have a similar guessing
entropy of a standard 6-digit pin (a password space of 106).
We designed three variants (6, 7, and 8 questions each with
10, 8, and 6 choices, respectively) of HuMan to test whether
users preferred fewer questions with more choices versus
more questions with fewer choices. The tradeoff is that with
questions with fewer choices, answering each individual
question might be easier, but the overall process takes longer.
Conversely, having less questions with more choices might
take less time overall, but answering each question is harder.
We could not use less than 6 question with 10 choices as
that would provide lower security guarantees than a 6-digit
PIN. We cannot use free form question because it is harder
for the machine to infer and verify (if the answer is correct
or not).
In total we had 31 participants (10 male, 21 female) and
their corresponding intimates and acquaintance from the un-
dergraduate population at our university. 21 of the intimates
spent between 4-8 hours per day with the participant while
the remaining 10 intimates lived with the participant. Among
the 31 acquaintances, 19 spent around 1-4 hours per day
with the participant, while the rest saw the participant almost
daily but did not really interact with him/her.
Results
We found no statistical difference (using t-test analysis
for gender, technical qualification, etc.) in the accuracy of
answers in all the 10-, 8-, and 6-choices variants. Therefore,
we aggregated results from all three variants together in
subsequent analysis.
Figure 3. Symbian - false positive and false negative rates
We evaluated the accuracy in terms of false positive rate
(when the participant was not able to login) and false nega-
tive rate (when intimates/acquaintances were able to login)
for different threshold values (see Figure 3). The threshold is
the percentage of questions a user/attacker needs to correctly
answer to authenticate to the system. Unfortunately, we
found that the threshold where false positive and negative
rates meet (approx 40%) is quite low (approx 35%). To
understand the reasons, we performed an in-depth analysis
on the types of questions asked and brought them into
4 categories depending on the focus of the question (see
Figure 4 for accuracy results).
Figure 4. Effect of types of questions (Symbian)
Who: For example, “who do you call the most?” An
accuracy advantage of the participant over potential attackers
is because people tend to remember the interactions with
other people.
What: For example, “what app do you usually use in
morning?” By investigating deeper in the questions asked,
we found that some of the choices were misleading. For
example, our questions differentiated deleting “sent SMS”
events from deleting “received SMS” events, whereas the
participants could only remember that they deleted an SMS.
When: For example, “when do you usually call Bob?”
This type of questions has a negative overall impact as
intimates were able to answer them with even higher ac-
curacy than the participant. Intuitively, this is possible when
intimates spend a lot of time with the participant.
Where: For example, “Where do you usually charge your
phone?” The where-type questions did not perform well and
we discovered that the accuracy for this type of questions
was high for the intimates.
VI. ANDROID STUDY
We found that our participants’ Symbian usage behavior
was limited to calls and SMSes. Unlike Symbian, Android
provides a richer set of multi-context data. In this study, we
investigated if better fingerprints could be generated from
the richer data-set.
User Study Setup
We asked participants to answer multiple-choice questions
with the following characteristics:
1) We asked 6 questions with 10 choices each, to achieve
the same security strength as a 6-digit pin. We did not
consider other options as our Symbian study showed
that there were no significant differences when 6, 8,
or 10 choices were used.
2) We limited our generated questions to Who and What.
In the Symbian study, participants performed better for
these types of questions (see Figure 4).
In addition to undergraduates from our university, we also
included working adults. In total, we had 13 participants (9
male and 4 female) out of which 9 were undergraduates
(age between 19 and 25) and 4 (age between 24 and
33) were working professionals. 11 of the intimates spent
between 4-8 hours per day with the participant while the
remaining 2 intimates lived with the participant Among the
13 acquaintances, 4 spent around 1-4 hours per day with the
participant, while the rest saw the participant almost daily
but did not really interact with him/her.
Results
Figure 5. Android - false positive and false negative rates
Figure 5 shows the false positive and false negative rates
of the test. This is a big improvement over the Symbian
results. We were able to increase the threshold to 61.8%
while decreasing both the false-positive and false-negative
rates to approximately 15.3%. The improved accuracy was
due to the changes in the user study design as well as the
richness of the android multi-context data-set. One possible
reason why intimates and acquaintances are still able to
answer many questions correctly could be because they can
observe a person and thus know a lot of details about the
person peculiar habits and characteristics.
VII. DISCUSSION
Characteristics of Memorable Fingerprints
Our user studies were a great learning process to allow us
to understand the characteristics of memorable fingerprint.
Broad Range of Events Necessary: Symbian users
hardly used their phones for anything but SMSes and calls,
from which very few memorable signatures could be con-
structed. On the other hand, Android provided more event
types including applications, emails, which allowed us to
recover more memorable fingerprints.
Use the Most Memorable Templates: We quickly re-
alized that certain events are more memorable than others.
We categorized our templates based on the type of infor-
mation they contained, i.e., “who”, “what”, “when”, etc. In
our experiments, we consistently found that the templates
containing “what” and “who” types were more memorable.
We also found that certain special types of fingerprints
performed well, e.g., those representing negative rules.
Limitations
Through our exploration with the fingerprints, we believe
that our user study provides a good test on the memorability
of fingerprints generated by HuMan and we also note some
of the limitations discovered through this exploration.
1) Trade-off between Power/Performance. There was an
inevitable minor issue on Android with regards to the
tradeoff between the slight lag in performance and
power drain due to the increase logging of more data.
2) Authentication. In authentication scenarios where a
system requires frequent authentication, the current
version of HuMan may not be the best fit because
of moderate accuracy and the time to answer one
question (9 seconds on average) as compared to 8.46
seconds on average to enter a 6 digit PIN (based on our
tests). However, some authentication scenarios where
HuMan is suitable might be 1) when the phone is
lost and needs to be locked remotely. 2) to unlock
or change the SIM card.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we looked at the usefulness of memorable
cellphone fingerprints. We designed HuMan, that uses cell-
phone usage patterns to generate memorable fingerprints. We
described the components of HuMan and presented detailed
user-based. This evaluation used Symbian and Android OSes
to understand the design criteria needed for generating
memorable fingerprints along with the effectiveness of these
fingerprints in an authentication scenario.
The current state of HuMan could achieve false positive
and negative rates of approximately 15.3%, and might not
be able to replace existing authentication systems in places
which require frequent authentication. However, what we
found was encouraging and opens numerous avenues for
further exploration and research. Moving forward, we plan
to continue our research into human-centric approaches in
generating quality fingerprints in a number of ways: 1) test-
ing HuMan with a broader and more diverse set of users; and
2) deploying it to other areas, beyond authentication, such as
context-aware profile systems. 3) analyze the scenario when
the attacker has a complete log of the data communication
from and to the cellphone.
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